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VALUING TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS: USE REAL OPTIONS THINKING 
BUT FORGET REAL OPTIONS VALUATION 
 
ABSTRACT 
Real options valuation (ROV) has recently been proposed as a promising solution to the 
deficiencies of traditional valuation methods when facing risky technology investments or 
ventures. Indeed ‘real option thinking’ - the managerial flexibility to capitalise on 
opportunities when they arise and/or to minimise the impact of threats - is precisely what is 
needed when faced with the uncertain future of technology investments. Notwithstanding this 
we argue that traditional decision tree analysis methods are preferred to ROV techniques 
when valuing technology investments that contain ‘real options’. Our reasoning is twofold. 
First, ROV techniques provide a sophisticated treatment of market risks, but do not deal with 
firm-specific risks. However, the elevated risk facing technology ventures is predominantly 
firm-specific risk, and these ventures face only about average levels of market risk. Second, 
ROV has a severe practical limitation in the context of new technology ventures. Normally, 
the favoured approach when using ROV to value investments is to use the ‘market asset 
disclaimer’ assumption. The starting point is to value the venture/project in the absence of the 
‘real options’ using traditional discounted cash flow techniques (to establish the value of the 
underlying asset). ROV analysis then adjusts this valuation to take account of the real 
options. But the first step makes no sense for technology ventures because these ‘real 
options’ are an integral part of the venture. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Real options provide a framework for decision making under uncertainty where the value of 
an investment is enhanced by the flexibility of future options – i.e. decisions that can be 
delayed or rescinded to enhance upside potential and/or contain downside losses of the 
investment. Real option approaches have been posited as both an analytical tool to value 
specific opportunities, that is real options valuation (ROV) (such as Trigeoris, 1998), and a 
strategic heuristic to aid decision making under conditions of uncertainty often referred to as 
“real options thinking” (such as McGrath, 1997). A substantial body of literature on ROV has 
appeared over recent years. Other contributors include (Angelis, 2000, 2002; Benninga & 
Tolkowsky, 2002; Boer, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003; Borissiouk & Peli, 2001; Brach & Paxson, 
2001; Cassimon, Engelen, Thomassen, & Van Wouwe, 2004; Davis & Owens, 2003; 
Faiferlick, Reichert, Andreoli, Ackerman, & al, 2003; Herath & Park, 1999; Jacob & Kwak, 
2003; Jagle, 1999; Lee & Paxson, 2001; Lint & Pennings, 1998, 2001; McGrath & 
MacMillan, 2000; Mellen, Evans, & Bishop, 2001; Neely & Neufville, 2001; Perlitz, Peske, 
& Schrank, 1999; Smith & Nau, 1995). Most recently a healthy debate concerning the scope 
and boundary of real options appeared in a special edition of the Academy of Management 
Review (see (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a, 2004b; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2004; McGrath, Ferrier, 
& Mendelow, 2004; Zardkoohi, 2004). 
Valuation of new technology ventures is a difficult and often contentious issue, and 
traditional valuation techniques, such as price-to-earnings ratios, market-based approaches 
and discounted cash flow (DCF) methods, each have significant shortfalls. Assuming that the 
venture has not yet entered the market or is in the early stage of earnings (and that earnings 
can reasonably be expected to grow very substantially), price-to-(current) earnings ratio (P/E) 
approaches are clearly not applicable.  For other methods, the situation is slightly different 
depending on whether we are dealing with a ‘disruptive’ technology (Bower & Christensen, 
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1995) that is breaking new ground in the market place, or ‘sustaining’ technological 
advancements where the new venture (with a better version of an existing product) enters an 
industry and market where there are already established firms and customers. Traditional 
market-based approaches (finding comparable traded assets to determine the valuation) are 
not applicable for disruptive technologies. They may not even be applicable for sustaining 
technologies. Even if a comparable technology is identifiable, it is highly unlikely that the 
technology was developed by a company which was sold at an analogous stage of 
development (to the current technology being developed), and/or that details of the sale are 
publicly known. Nor is it likely that the analogy company would be publicly listed prior to 
achieving substantial earnings (we are only considering the case where the technology is 
being valued prior to generating a substantial income stream). Hence, it is highly unlikely that 
suitable market data is available for establishing a valuation. 
DCF methods of valuation also face significant problems. Apart from the difficulty of 
estimating future cash flows, traditional discounted cash flow (DCF) methods have long been 
recognised as having two main flaws when it comes to evaluating risky enterprises (e.g. 
Hodder & Riggs, 1985). The first problem is that they normally assume a constant discount 
rate, and therefore do not account for the time-varying risk profile typical of most real new 
venture situations. A related problem is to determining how to adjust the discount rate to take 
account of perceived risk. The second problem with DCF methods is that they fail to capture 
the value created by future managerial flexibility – whereby the upside of opportunities can 
be seized, and the downside of possible risks can be minimised.  
Real option approaches to valuation have emerged as a promising method for 
addressing both of these shortcomings of traditional DCF methods. To address the first 
problem, ROV accounts for risk using market-based volatilities. Hence the contentious issue 
of determining a discount rate to account for risk is avoided.  In dealing with the second 
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problem, ROV explicitly accounts for the option value inherent in new technologies - that is, 
the flexibility of future decisions increases the value of the technology. This will normally 
occur for technology investments because investments are incremental and sequential in 
nature (such as stages of technology development, commercialisation, market launch), and 
the decision maker has the option available to abandon certain paths (i.e. has no obligation to 
make investment in future stages). Decisions are made in an uncertain environment, and 
uncertainty decreases over time as more information is obtained. Hence, better, more 
informed decisions can be made about further investment (or not) at later points in time.  
This paper critically examines the application of real options as an analytical tool to 
provide a valuation for a specific new technology, or alternatively to evaluate a new venture 
based on a new technology. At the heart of this examination is the way risks are characterised 
and treated. We start by discussing the nature of uncertainty associated with technology 
projects, and then discuss traditional discounted cash flow valuation methods and how they 
deal with risk. Real option analysis is then introduced, and its treatment of uncertainty 
analysed. The paper concludes by suggesting a modified valuation approach for dealing with 
technology investments that contain real options. 
2 UNCERTAINTY IN TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
New ventures exploiting disruptive technology are typically subject to high mortality risk 
(Shepherd, Douglas, & Shanley, 2000; Stinchcombe, 1965), and it is the uncertainty1 about 
future outcomes that makes their valuation difficult. For cash-flow based valuation 
techniques, the way they treat and penalise risk differentiates between techniques. Of critical 
importance in traditional finance theory is the distinction between market and firm-specific 
risk. Market risk is that part of risk correlated with the market (known as systematic risk), 
                                                 
1 We treat the terms risk and uncertainty interchangeably in this paper. We acknowledge the differences between 
known and knowable risks, and unknowable uncertainty traced to the pioneering work of Knight (1921) In our 
context we consider only risks that can be assessed either objectively or subjectively (through management 
judgement), referred to as decision making under uncertainty in the decision sciences tradition (Raiffa, 1968). 
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whereas firm-specific risk (known as private or unsystematic risk) is unique to the firm (e.g. 
T. E. Copeland, Weston, & Shastri, 2005). Finance evaluation methods, both DCF and ROV, 
deal only with the market component of risk. For DCF techniques, the accepted way to adjust 
discount rates for risk is to find an analogous traded entity (or portfolio of traded entities) – 
immediately implying a market-related risk. Moreover, the Capital Asset Pricing Model2 
(CAPM) is used to determine the appropriate discount rate (T. E. Copeland et al., 2005).  
This has two important implications for the treatment of risk. First, no penalty is applied for 
specific risks because it is argued that they can be fully diversified. Consequently, the 
discount rate is based on the ‘Beta’ of a firm or portfolio. Second, market risk is assumed to 
be uniform over time – hence a constant discount rate provides an appropriate ‘penalty’ for 
market risks. Alternatively, when using ROV, the basis of the whole approach is based on 
market price movements (i.e. assuming non-arbitrage conditions, the prices for portfolios of 
equivalent assets must track together). Hence, it is a market component of risk that is 
addressed. 
We argue that the high levels of risk associated with technology ventures are largely 
due to firm-specific risk, and that these should attract a risk penalty. As a starting point, let’s 
consider empirical investment behaviour for technology ventures. Discount rates used by 
venture capitalists are reportedly very high, in the range 20% - 100% according to (Timmons 
& Spinelli, 2004) or 40% - 75% (Westland, 2002, p. 136). The upper part of these ranges is 
well beyond the empirically observed range of market-risk-adjusted discount rates for traded 
companies. Hence, we must conclude that investors identify an element of firm-specific risks 
and attempt to extract a penalty for this risk. 
Examination of the sources of uncertainty confirms that many of the risks for 
technology ventures are indeed firm specific. McGrath (1997) provides a comprehensive 
                                                 
2 It is assumed that firm-specific risk can be fully hedged by the investor. 
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treatment of uncertainty underlying technology projects. She identifies four sources of 
uncertainty affecting the returns on investment, each with several underlying contingent 
factors which determine the level of uncertainty as shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We argue that in addition to these revenue and cost uncertainties, technical failure is 
also widely reported as a substantial source of risk. For example, staged process of drug 
development and testing imposed by regulation has received wide attention (e.g. Brach & 
Paxson, 2001; Jacob & Kwak, 2003; Jagle, 1999; Perlitz et al., 1999). Risk of technical 
failure has also been widely applied in other contexts (e.g. Borissiouk & Peli, 2001; Herath & 
Park, 1999; Morris, Teisberg, & Kolbe, 1991). Considering all these factors, it becomes clear 
that technology venture risk is largely driven by unique conditions related to the technology 
venture, rather than driven by risks associated with market conditions.  
Risk associated with level of demand, which on face value might be considered market 
risk, has a large firm-specific component for technology firms. Level of demand risk for new 
technologies is largely related to the market size for the technology (disruptive technologies) 
and/or the market share the firm will capture (disruptive and sustaining technologies). These 
are firm-specific risks. By comparison, the market risk component is related to variations 
over time from the current (known) market prices and levels of demand. This is likely to 
represent only a small potion of the risk for new technologies. Analogous arguments can be 
made for all revenue-oriented factors.  
For commercialisation-cost factors, much more of the uncertainty could be common to 
the industry that the firm is entering (sustaining technologies) or related industries if none 
exists (disruptive technologies). This said, parallel technology development and co-
specialised assets could be quite specific to the firm. Accordingly, we argue that risks of 
technology failure are firm-specific risks. 
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Finally, uncertainty over technology development costs is largely firm specific. While 
general price movements will, of course, impact development costs, usually a far greater level 
of uncertainty is related to the amount of development effort that will be required to 
successfully develop the technology. 
In addition, Shepherd, Douglas & Shanley (2000) and Douglas & Shepherd (2002) 
argue that three major sources of mortality risk for new ventures are ignorance on the part of 
the new venture’s target consumers, the firm’s production personnel, and its managers. The 
latter two groups are internal to the new venture, and the successful management of 
consumers (marketing management) is dependent on the knowledge and experience of the 
management team. Other research (Beverland & Lockshin, 2004; Litvak & Maule, 1980) 
supports the view that deficiencies in knowledge and skills in marketing significantly 
contributes to new venture failure. Readiness (to invest) on the part of the venture capitalist is 
not achieved until these firm-specific risks have been mitigated to an acceptable degree by 
the venture’s management team. Gartner Starr, & Bhat (1999) identified seven  factors that 
distinguished surviving and non-surviving firms, of which all but one (in a growth industry) 
were firm specific. Accordingly, ignorance-based sources of new venture risk may be said to 
be largely firm-specific. Within the context of high technology new ventures, recent research 
suggests the venture idea and its degree of innovation, the venture strategy and the 
commitment, experience, heterogeneity and marketing skills of the team  are critical for 
success (Aspelund, Berg-Utby, & Skjevdal, 2005; Cohrev & Anderson, 2006). Again, all 
these factors are firm specific. 
3 TRADITIONAL DCF METHODS 
3.1 The Venture Capitalist Net Present Value Method 
To start our discussion we consider the traditional Venture Capitalist Net Present Value (VC-
NPV) approach as described, for example, by Timmons and Spinelli (2004). Although the 
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limitations of simple DCF techniques have been widely discussed elsewhere, it represents an 
important starting point for comparison with ROV. We start simply and progressively 
consider more complex analysis techniques. 
To facilitate our discussion we consider a simple example based on one suggested by 
Herath and Park (1999). Their application was an R&D project within a mature firm, but the 
method equally applies for a new venture. We assume that the new technological venture 
requires investment in two phases of development – research and commercialisation. If the 
first stage is successful, the venture may then face either a favourable or an unfavourable 
market. The VC-NPV approach does not explicitly consider multiple scenarios, but analyses 
a single (most-likely) scenario for the venture, and penalises this high-risk investment by 
imposing a very high discount rate. Specifically, annual net cash flows are estimated until the 
terminal year, and net income is estimated in the terminal year assuming the venture is 
successful. A price-earnings (P/E) value is chosen based on P/Es of similar enterprises, and 
the NPV of the cash flows and of the terminal profit times the P/E is calculated using a 
typically high discount rate which reflects the perceived risk of the investment. 
For our example, assume that expected cash flows are -$3m in each of years 0, 1, 2, and 
3 (technology development costs); -$60m in year 4 (commercialisation launch cost); and 
$20m in year 5 (profits in first year after launch). We assume a P/E = 9 at the end of year 5. 
Following the VC-NPV method, annual profits and venture value are both treated as cash 
flows in the terminal year. If we apply a discount rate of 50%, our valuation would yield: 
NPV = 5432 1.5
$200m 
1.5
$60m-  
1.5
$3m-  
1.5
$3m- 
1.5
$3m-  3m$ +++++− = $7.26m 
 
We emphasise two areas of limitations for this method. First, the VC-NPV approach 
fails to explicitly consider multiple options and/or scenarios for the venture. The impact of 
this limitation will be explored in subsequent sections. Second, the treatment of risk is simply 
to assign a high discount rate. Although this may be regarded as a mis-application of NPV 
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since this limitation of the NPV approach for risky projects has been long acknowledged in 
the literature (Hodder & Riggs, 1985), it nonetheless reflects widespread practice as reported 
by Timmons and Spinelli (2004). This is not surprising. Practitioners armed with only NPV 
as a tool will naturally try to use the only available risk adjustment mechanism (i.e. raising 
the discount rate), to deal with all the relevant risks facing them. Hence, although this 
limitation has been reported elsewhere, it is useful to emphasise its impact in our context. 
The problem with simply inflating the discount rate due to perceived risk stems from a 
failure to distinguish between specific risk and market risk. Much of the risk associated with 
a new venture is specific – the high discount rates reported above are not based on finding 
traded securities (or portfolio) with comparable market risks. Hence, the risk ‘penalty’ is 
assigned in an arbitrary way.3  To illustrate the potentially strong impact of the largely 
arbitrary choice of discount rate, in Table 2 we provide a sensitivity analysis for our example 
of the valuation over the range reportedly used in practice (Timmons & Spinelli, 2004). 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Moreover, a time-based penalty (i.e. discount rate) is not appropriate for most specific 
risks which largely vary in a lumpy manner at discrete times rather than continuously over 
time. The common practice in the application of NPV methods, as reflected in the VC-NPV 
approach above, is to adjust the discount rate for the riskiness of the project. 
To illustrate the error of adjusting the discount rate for firm-specific risk, we use an 
extreme example of pure firm-specific risk. Consider two investment options. Investment A 
pays $600 immediately if a ‘1’ is rolled on a standard die. Investment B is identical, except 
that the die roll and payout occurs in ten years time (but the decision to invest is made now). 
                                                 
3 One rationale that might be utilised is to estimate the probability of failure (Pf) from experience with ventures 
that are similar in most or many respects to the one under consideration. If Pf = 33.3%, for example, the 
probability of success (Ps) is 66.7%. Accordingly the risk premium is calculated as Pf/Ps = 50%, since the 
successful firms are expected to repay the investor for the (lost) investment in the failed enterprises. This risk 
premium is added to the risk-free rate to arrive at the opportunity discount rate. 
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Since the risk is fully diversifiable, Investment A is valued at $100 (=$600 * 1/6). What 
should the individual pay (now) for investment B? The only difference between the two 
opportunities is the timing. The value of the investment B in ten years time is $100 (in dollars 
of that day). But this must be discounted to take into account the time value of money. Since 
there is no risk associated with investment B during the intervening ten years, we should use 
the risk free rate (say 5%). The $100 discounted over the ten years yields $61.39. But what if 
we erroneously apply the risk inflated discount rate approach. This is a risky investment, so 
lets assume a risk adjusted discount rate of, say, 25%. For investment B, $100 discounted for 
10 years at 25% yields NPV(B) = $10.73. Clearly, the risk adjusted NPV method grossly 
over penalises investment B ($10.73 vs correct value of $61.39).  
Importantly then, the VC-NPV approach unfairly disadvantages risky longer-term 
ventures. More generally, risk adjustments by inflating discount rates are strictly only 
appropriate where the overall uncertainty increases uniformly over time. This assumption is 
reasonable when dealing with market risks (for which DCF techniques were developed), but 
is seldom even a rough approximation for specific risks. 
3.2 First Chicago Method (Expected NPV) 
The ‘First Chicago’ method4 (Timmons & Spinelli, 2004) extends the VC-NPV method 
above by explicitly considering several possible scenarios for the venture, assessing the 
probability of each scenario, then calculating the NPV of the expected cash flows using a 
somewhat lower (but still relatively high) discount rate. Specifically, the method specifies 
several alternative scenarios for the venture. Typically, three scenarios are used, viz: the ‘best 
guess’(most likely, median case); the ‘best case’ (optimistic) and the ‘worst case’ 
(pessimistic). For each of the three scenarios, management must estimate the (subjective) 
probability that the scenario will occur, and the cash flows for each scenario are estimated as 
                                                 
4 This is a specific application of the Expected NPV technique. 
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for VC-NPV method. The valuation is equal to the expected (probability weighted) NPV of 
the three scenarios. 
Expanding on our example above, we assume three scenarios, as shown in Table 3. 
Note that the expected value of the two ‘successful’ scenarios is set to be equal to the Year 5 
return in the original example. Using the First Chicago method, we now apply a substantially 
lower discount rate since we have explicitly accounted for much of the risk in the venture. In 
Table 4 we provide a sensitivity analysis, varying the discount rate over the range of values 
appropriate for this method. 
TABLES 3 & 4 ABOUT HERE 
The advantages of this approach are that some of the risks associated with the venture 
are explicitly identified and different types of risk are separated and explicitly assessed. As 
such, this approach acts as a starting point for dealing with the risks appropriately in the 
valuation. An important consequence of dealing with many sources of risk explicitly is a 
reduction in the sensitivity of the valuation to the discount rate – which is now being used to 
account for less of the overall risk facing the venture. Moreover, if we can assume that the 
risk being accounted for by the discount rate is market risk, then we have a basis for setting 
its value. At the very least, this assumption is more nearly valid than earlier since much of the 
specific risk (e.g. technical risk) is accounted for. In the well-established tradition of DCF for 
capital budgeting, the discount rate is set as equal to the market return of a ‘twin security’ of 
equivalent riskiness. 
3.3 Decision Tree Analysis  
For decision making with multiple discrete options, such as our valuation example, Decision 
Tree Analysis (DTA) has a long tradition in management science. (Laughton, 1998). We are 
not advocating the full conventions of  “decision analysis” (Raiffa, 1968) that involve 
constructing (or defining) the utility function of the decision maker, but rather the simple 
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decision tree analysis which involves calculating the expected NPV using a decision tree. 
Using DTA we are able to extend traditional DCF approaches to explicitly include the 
flexibility of future management decisions. As such, DTA is a simple, traditional method that 
allows us to calculate an ‘option value’ – albeit in a very different way to ROV. 
To illustrate the approach, we extend the example above to include the option to 
abandon the new venture after the R&D expenditures of years 0-3, before commercialisation. 
We assume that at that time we could observe the current market conditions which give us a 
better (although still not perfect) idea of the likelihood of the three scenarios. Regardless of 
the market conditions, the probability that competitive blocking may occur is still assessed as 
40%. If market conditions are good (70% probability), we assume a 40% chance of our best-
case scenario, and a 20% probability of our median scenario. However, if market conditions 
are poor, we assume there is no chance of our best case scenario, and a 60% chance of our 
median scenario. (Note that the overall probability of each scenario is unaltered). The 
resulting decision tree is displayed in Figure 1 where we assume a discount rate of 20%. 
Using the conventional notation, square forks in the tree represent managerial decision points, 
while circles represent uncertain outcomes beyond managerial control. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
To resolve the decision, the tree is analysed from right to left calculating expected 
present values at each point. Normally, a constant discount rate is applied. Wherever a 
decision is required, the option yielding the highest NPV is chosen. In this case, we would 
exercise our option not to proceed with commercialisation if market conditions are 
unfavourable. It is this option not to proceed with commercialisation under poor market 
conditions that alters our overall valuation compared to the First Chicago method above. 
Table 5 below summarises the difference in valuation between the decision tree approach and 
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the First Chicago method using different discount rates. It is insightful to notice that the 
‘option value’ represents a substantial portion of the valuation for all discount rates. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
While this option considers an abandonment option, other ‘real options’ relevant for 
technology development contexts include the option to defer or stage investments, to alter 
scale, and to expand the scope of commercial opportunities (Trigeoris, 1998, pp. 2-3). It is the 
valuation of options such as these – which all relate to future managerial flexibility – that is 
the focus of real option approaches. Hence decision trees have a substantial advantage over 
other DCF methods because they are able to capture the value of future options. 
4 REAL OPTION VALUATION 
ROV applies the techniques developed to value financial options (for traded securities) to 
‘real’ assets. ROV recognise that the managerial flexibility to delay decisions is somewhat 
analogous to financial options. Using our example, investment in R&D provides the option, 
but not the obligation, to commercialise. The commercialisation decision can be made some 
time in the future, when we know the prevailing market conditions better. This is similar to a 
call option on a security, where the initial investment (purchasing the option) provides the 
opportunity to exercise the option at some future time if the market price is above the strike 
price, but carries no obligation to do so if the market price is below the strike price.  
4.1 The Basis of Real Options Valuation 
There are two fundamental tenets of all ROV techniques. First, they include some managerial 
flexibility (the option), as we have seen for DTA above. Second, ROV techniques use 
market-based price information as the basis to value the riskiness (volatility) of the 
investment (excluding the option). The value of the option is then determined by assuming no 
arbitrage conditions. The original ROV methods identified a (possibly dynamic) replicating 
portfolio of traded securities that match the volatility (variation in valuation over time) of the 
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investment excluding the option. The future value of this portfolio is modelled based on 
knowledge of historic price movements (Borison, 2005). 
For many applications of real options, it is not possible to approximate the investment 
with a portfolio of traded securities. To overcome this difficulty, the prevailing ROV 
approach is to apply a ‘Marketed Asset Disclaimer’ assumption (T. Copeland & Antikrov, 
2001, p. 94; Triantis, 2005).  Here, traditional NPV analysis is used to establish a value of the 
underlying project. The volatility of this value is then modelled based on prices of relevant 
traded securities. For example, if the investment is a project in the oil industry, its volatility 
could be modelled (in part) based on oil prices. It is this approach that we follow in this 
paper, since it is not feasible to find a replicating portfolio for new disruptive technologies. 
ROV methods can also be broadly classified into two types – continuous time methods, 
such as the well-known Black-Scholes formula for call-options, and discrete-time methods 
that utilise decision trees (albeit with different calculations to traditional DTA). We will 
confine our attention to discrete-time methods because they lend themselves more readily to 
technology contexts which are easily conceptualised as a series of discrete events, such as the 
outcome of R&D (T. Copeland & Antikrov, 2001, p. 270). This said, our arguments apply 
equally for both techniques. In fact, at the limit, as time intervals approach zero, discrete time 
methods and continuous time methods are equivalent (T. Copeland & Antikrov, 2001).  
To illustrate the difference between decision trees and real options analysis, we will 
draw on a simple example from Copeland and Antikrov (2001). The example is a deferral-
type option, and is displayed as a decision tree in Figure 2. The firm can invest now (say in a 
plant) with a payback in one year of $170,000 in the ‘up state’ or $65,000 in the ‘down state’. 
Alternatively, the investment decision can be delayed by one year, with identical cost and 
paybacks. The risk free interest rate (rf) is assumed to be 10%. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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Both the decision tree analysis and the real options analysis approach the upper part of 
the tree (Invest Now) identically. To calculate its present value, a risk premium, or discount 
rate, must be determined. Theoretically, this is done by identifying a ‘twin security’ that is 
identically correlated to the investment opportunity. Assume such a twin security, S, is 
identified with a market price now of S0 = $20, and would have a value in the up state of S+ = 
$34 and a value in the down state of S- = $13. Using a standard DCF approach, the risk 
adjusted discount rate for the twin security (or project) can be calculated by solving: 
Twin security NPV = $20 = 
k1
 0.5($14)  0.5($34)
+
+  
This gives k = 17.5%. Using this discount rate, the present value of ‘Invest Now’ 
payoffs is calculated as $100,000, and hence the ‘Invest Now’ NPV = $100,000 - $115,000 =    
–$15,000. Alternatively, we can think of the ‘Invest Now’ payoffs as exactly equivalent to 
5,000 shares in the twin security, and therefore valued at $100,000. 
If we look at the delayed investment option, we would clearly go ahead and invest if the 
‘up state’ is realised, but choose not to invest in the down state. Hence the payoffs are 
$55,000 in the ‘up state’ and $0 in the ‘down state’. Applying the traditional DCF decision 
tree approach to analyse the bottom half of the tree, and using the discount rate of k = 17.5% 
we get: 
‘Delay Investment’ NPV = 
0.1751
 0.5($0)  0)0.5($55,00
+
+  = $23,400 
Hence, the option value is this difference between the two NPVs, viz: $23,400 - (-$15,000) = 
$38,400.   
At face value this seems a reasonable approach to valuing the ‘Delay Investment’ 
option. But the problem with the analysis is that the riskiness of the ‘Invest Now’ (top) half of 
the tree and the ‘Delay Investment’ (bottom) half of the tree are different. Hence, it is not 
valid to use the same discount rate. 
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Real options analysis corrects for this problem by constructing a replicating portfolio of 
m shares of the twin security, and B dollars of risk-free $1 bonds (at the risk-free rate rf  of 
10%) that identically match the payoffs in the bottom half of the tree: 
 Replicating portfolio in the ‘up state’: m($34) + B(1+rf) = $55,000 
 Replicating portfolio in the ‘down state’:  m($34) + B(1+rf) = $0 
 
Solving these two equations for the two unknowns, we get m = 2,620 and B = -31,530. Then 
to get the NPV of the ‘Delay Investment’ option: 
‘Delay Investment’ NPV = m($20/share) + B($1 bond) =  $20,870 
 
Again, the option value is this difference between the two NPVs, or  
Option value = $20,870 – (-$15,000) = $35,870 
 
The real option approach has now correctly accounted for the different risk profiles of the top 
and bottom of our tree. The NPV of the ‘Delay Investment’ has changed from $23,400 to 
$20,870 and the option value has changed from $38,400 to $35,870.  
 
4.2 Our Earlier Example 
Let us turn our attention back to our simple example, and apply the real option approach. Our 
first difficulty, of course, is that we cannot in practice identify a ‘twin security’ that matches 
our R&D project. Using the ‘Marketed Asset Disclaimer’ assumption, we first calculate the 
NPV for each node of our decision tree, assuming the project does not contain the flexibility 
to abandon the commercial launch in year 4. To do so, we first need to select an appropriate 
discount rate for this project (without flexibility). For illustrative purposes, let’s assume a 
discount rate of 20%. Then, the NPV values at each node of the tree are as shown in Figure 3. 
In other words, the expected NPV is calculated for each node of the tree, in much the same 
way as the First Chicago Method. 
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FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 4 uses these NPV values to conduct the real options analysis. The two 
probability forks in the tree are calculated by solving the simultaneous equations of m shares 
of the project at the equivalent branch in Figure 3 and B dollars borrowed at the risk free rate. 
Ultimately, the real option analysis results in a valuation of $6.39m. This compares to $5.53m 
for the decision tree approach using a 20% discount rate. Recalling that the ‘no-option’ DCF 
results in a NPV of $0.81m, real option analysis provides an option value of $5.58m 
compared with $4.72m for the decision tree. 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
First we note that the difference between the real option and decision tree valuations is 
small compared to neglecting to take account of managerial flexibility appropriately. 
Moreover, we note that for the NPV calculation in the ROV, the same 20% discount rate was 
used as for the DTA. The project without managerial flexibility is, however, more risky and 
should be evaluated with a higher discount rate. Further analysis reveals that had we chosen a 
discount rate of approximately 21.5% for the NPV without managerial flexibility the ROV 
valuation would be identical to the DTA valuation. 
Of critical importance is that there is no benchmark available to establish the 
appropriate discount rate for the first step of ROV. New technology investments without 
managerial flexibility just don’t exist. Hence there are no comparables to determine the 
appropriate discount rate. This is quite different to other reported applications of ROV. 
Consider, for example, a delay investment option. The investor can build a manufacturing 
plant now, or has the option to delay the decision to build by, say, one year. In this case, the 
investment without managerial flexibility (build the plant now) has reasonable comparables, 
and an appropriate discount rate for the initial NPV can be determined. 
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TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
5 SUMMARY OF VALUATION APPROACHES 
We conclude by comparing the scope of each approach. The VC-NPV approach is only 
suitable when risk are dominated by market risks – or in other words – standard opportunities 
in established industry contexts. This is not a scenario that technology ventures / projects 
face. 
The First Chicago (expected NPV) Method explicitly introduces several firm-specific 
scenarios, weighting each scenario according to the subjective probability that it will occur. 
However, it does not allow for future managerial flexibility. Hence, it is most appropriate 
when an investment decision is dominated by an initial investment, with no or little 
subsequent investment discretion. Again, this is not the type of investment regime normally 
facing technology investments, which typically commence with relatively small outlays, 
followed by increasingly large successive investment decisions. This said, the approach is 
suitable for some incremental innovations, involving a single initial technology investment 
(such as a web site development for a new market opportunity) that subsequently faces 
primarily market risks. 
Both DTA and ROV incorporate managerial flexibility, such that investments may be 
staged, and investment options re-evaluated at successive decision points. This is a more 
realistic representation of typical technology investments. Both techniques account for 
market risks. If a suitable traded security is available for the analysis, ROV provides a 
slightly more accurate treatment of market risk. However, we argue above that such a 
security simply would not exist for any technology investment. In essence, the biggest error 
in the treatment of market risk is finding a suitable comparable security (selecting discount 
rate), rather than the nuances of the mathematical treatment. Hence, we advocate the use of 
the simpler DTA approach. 
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This said, while both DTA and ROV model firm-specific risks, neither approach 
penalise a valuation for these firm-specific risks. We argue that the reality of most technology 
investments is that risk is dominated by firm-specific risks, and that investors expect to be 
compensated for this risk. This is a substantial weakness of all DCF and ROV approaches. 
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper argues that real options valuation (ROV) is not the answer for improving the 
valuation of new technological ventures. We argue that the high levels of risk and uncertainty 
generally associated with technology ventures are largely attributable to unique or firm-
specific risk. We also maintain that investors in technology firms are justified in expecting a 
valuation penalty for this specific risk, since this risk is difficult to hedge through 
diversification compared with stock market investments. We propose a way forward is to 
base valuations on traditional decision analysis approaches, and to make subjectively based 
adjustments for firm specific risk.  
6.1 Implications for Practice 
We find that traditional Decision Tree Analysis (DTA) techniques are preferred over ROV 
techniques for dealing with this managerial flexibility. For the illustrative examples, we show 
that there is only a marginal difference between the evaluation using ROV and the much 
simpler and more intuitive DTA. More importantly, we question the ability in practice to 
correctly determine the ‘no flexibility’ baseline valuation required for ROV.  
6.2 Implications for Research 
This paper identifies the need for more research on both valuation techniques and 
empirical investor behaviour when they are faced with substantial firm-specific risk. ROV 
and other techniques that deal with the sophisticated treatment of market risk are misdirected 
in their attempts to substantially improve valuation of technological ventures. Rather, 
techniques that better deal with firm-specific risk are needed. Dealing with firm-specific risk 
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and the valuation of technological ventures are under-researched topics. While there will 
always be some element of subjectivity in the judgement and/or negotiation in the appropriate 
treatment of specific risk, it should be possible to provide some type of benchmark to guide 
decisions. We call for more empirical work in this domain. 
6.3 Limitations 
Our conclusions hinge on two assumptions. First, that the dominant source of risk for new 
technology ventures is firm-specific risk. Second, that investors for technology projects can 
not fully hedge firm-specific risks, and accordingly expect to be compensated for this risk. 
While we believe available evidence lends support to these two assumptions, we are not 
aware of any rigorous study to support the general validity of these assumptions. 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
The paper reinforces the view that traditional DCF techniques, and the common 
practice of using high discount rates, are not appropriate for dealing with firm-specific risk. 
Although this has long been recognised in the finance literature (Hodder & Riggs, 1985), the 
message has apparently not permeated through to practice and the treatment of new venture 
valuation in current entrepreneurship textbooks. Our examples emphasises the folly of 
employing simple DCF methods. We have demonstrated the critical importance of explicitly 
accounting for future managerial flexibility – what might be termed “real-options thinking” –
– when valuing new technological ventures. However, we argue that the older tradition of 
Decision Tree Analysis is a more appropriate technique for dealing with the types of 
uncertainties facing technology investments than Real Option Valuation techniques. 
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Table 1: Sources of Uncertainty Affecting Returns on Investment 
Sources of Uncertainty Contingent Factors 
Total cumulative net revenues Level of demand 
Adoption speed 
Likelihood of blocking 
Likelihood of expropriation 
Sustainability of revenues Likelihood of matching 
Likelihood of imitation 
Commercialisation costs Infrastructure requirements 
Parallel technology development 
Co-specialised asset requirements 
Technology development costs Spillover potential 
Life-cycle effects 
 
 
 
Table 2: Impact of Discount Rate on Valuation 
Discount rate 20% 30% 40% 50% 75% 100% 
Valuation ($m) $42.12 $24.41 $13.80 $7.26 -$0.47 -$3.13 
 
 
 
Table 3: Example of First Chicago Approach 
Scenario Probability Year 0-3 Year 4 Year 5 
Development 
Unsuccessful 
 
30% $3m development 
costs 
- - 
Worst Case – 
Market Blocked 
28% 
(= 70% x 
40%) 
$3m development 
costs 
$60m commercial-
isation costs 
Terminal value = $0m net 
annual earnings 
Best guess - 
$10m annual 
earnings 
33.6% 
(=70%x60%
x75%) 
$3m development 
costs 
$60m commercial-
isation costs 
Terminal value = $8m net 
annual earnings 
 x 10 (P/E value) 
Best Case - 
$50m annual 
earnings 
8.4% 
(=70%x60%
x25%) 
$3m development 
costs 
$60m commercial-
isation costs 
Terminal value = $60m net 
annual earnings 
x 10 (P/E value) 
Expected Cash 
Flows 
 -$3m -$42m $86.8m 
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Table 4: Impact of Discount Rate on Valuation 
Discount 
rate 
15% 20% 25% 30% 40% 
Valuation 
($m) 
$3.72 $0.81 -$1.29 -$2.79 -$4.64 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Difference in Valuation using the Different Methods 
Discount rate Decision Tree method 
(millions) 
First Chicago method 
(millions) 
Option Value 
(millions) 
15% $8.89 $3.90 $4.99 
20% $5.53 $0.81 $4.73 
25% $3.01 -$1.40 $4.42 
30% $1.11 -$2.98 $4.09 
40% -$1.44 -$4.90 $3.46 
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Table 7: Variance of Returns due to Specific Risks 
Scenario Prob NPV(m) NPV2 prob * NPV 
prob * 
NPV2 
R&D Fails 0.300 -$9.32 8.69E+01 -$2.80 2.61E+01 
Poor Market - Abandon 0.490 -$9.32 8.69E+01 -$4.57 4.26E+01 
Market Blocked 0.084 -$43.08 1.86E+03 -$3.62 1.56E+02 
Best Guess + Best Case  0.126 $131.07 1.72E+04 $16.51 2.16E+03 
   Sum $5.53 2.39E+03 
 
Table 8: Metrics of Specific Risk Levels 
Valuation $5.53m 
Standard Deviation value due to specific risk $49.6m 
Hi Value $131m 
Lo Value -$43m 
 
 
  
30 
 
40% $198.05 =$241.13-$33.76-$9.32
$241.13
NO $61.41
-$33.76  =40%*$198.05+20%*-$2.89+40%*-$43.08
20% -$2.89 =$40.19-$33.76-$9.32
$40.19
40% -$43.08 =$0-$33.76-$9.32
$0.00
30% Commercialise
$0.00 $61.41
YES
$0.00 -$9.32
70% $11.90
$0.00  =30%*$61.41+70%*-$9.32
0% $198.05 =$241.13-$33.76-$9.32
$241.13
NO -$18.97
-$33.76  =0%*$198.05+60%*-$2.89+40%*-$43.08
60% -$2.89 =$40.19-$33.76-$9.32
$40.19
40% -$43.08 =$0-$33.76-$9.32
$0.00
70% Abandon
$0.00 -$9.32
YES
NPV = $5.53 $0.00 -$9.32
$5.53
-$9.32  =70%*$11.90+30%*-$9.32
30%
$0.00 -$9.32
 t=0  t = 4  t = 5
 Invest $3m x 4 years R&D?  Invest $70m to commercialise?  Terminal Venture Values
 NPV Investment = -$9.32  PV = $70/1.2^4 = $33.76  PV = $600/1.2^5 = $241.13, or
 PV = $100/1.2^5 = $40.19
Invesrt R&D
Sucess R&D
Unsucess R&D
Good market
Poor market
Commercialise
Abandon
Best Case
Best Guess
Blocked
Commercialise
Abandon
Best Case
Best Guess
Blocked
 
Figure 1: Decision Tree Analysis 
  
31 
 
 
50%
$170
-$115
50%
$65
YES
$170-$115
50% Invest
$55
NO
$0
$0
YES
$65-$115
50% Don't Invest
$0
NO
$0
 t=0  t = 1
Real Option
Invest Now
Delay Decision
Good Conditions
Poor Conditions
Good Conditions
Poor Conditions
Invest
Don't Invest
Invest
Don't Invest
 
 
Figure 2: The Basis of the Real Option Approach 
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40%
$600.00
30% $146.70
 =(40%*$600+20%*$100+40%*$0)/1.2-$70
20%
$100.00
40%
$0.00
70% $30.01
 =30%*$146.70+70%*-$20.00
0%
$600.00
70% -$20.00
 =(0%*$600+60%*$100+40%*$0)/1.2-$70
60%
$100.00
40%
NPV = $0.81 $0.00
$0.81
 =(70%*$30.01+30%*$0)/1.2^4-9.32
30%
$0.00
 t=0  t = 4  t = 5
 Invest $3m x 4 years R&D?  Invest $70m to commercialise  Terminal Venture Values
 NPV Investment = -$9.32
Invesrt R&D
Sucess R&D
Unsucess R&D
Good market
Poor market
Best Case
Best Guess
Blocked
Best Case
Best Guess
Blocked
 
Figure 3: Calculating NPVs without Flexibility 
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30% $146.7 (Commercialise)
$38.77 (No Arbitrage)
70%
$6.39 70% $0.00 (Abandon)
= 15.71 (No Arbitrage) - $9.32
30% $0.00 (Abandon)
 t=0  t = 4
 Invest $3m x 4 years R&D?  Invest $70m to commercialise?
 NPV Investment = -$9.32
Invest R&D
Sucess R&D
Unsucess R&D
Good market
Poor market
 
 
 
Figure  4: Real Option Calculations 
 
